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Thermal Facial Analysis for Deception Detection
Bashar A. Rajoub, Member, IEEE, and Reyer Zwiggelaar
Abstract— Thermal imaging technology can be used to detect
stress levels in humans based on the radiated heat from their
face. In this paper, we use thermal imaging to monitor the
periorbital region’s thermal variations and test whether it can
offer a discriminative signature for detecting deception. We start
by presenting an overview on automated deception detection and
propose a novel methodology, which we validate experimentally
on 492 thermal responses (249 lies and 243 truths) extracted from
25 participants. The novelty of this paper lies in scoring a larger
number of questions per subject, emphasizing a within-person
approach for learning from data, proposing a framework for
validating the decision making process, and correct evaluation of
the generalization performance. A k-nearest neighbor classifier
was used to classify the thermal responses using different strate-
gies for data representation. We report an 87% ability to predict
the lie/truth responses based on a within-person methodology and
fivefold cross validation. Our results also show that the between-
person approach for modeling deception does not generalize very
well across the training data.
Index Terms— Automated deception detection, behavioural
analysis, facial analysis, thermal imaging.
I. INTRODUCTION
VARIOUS studies have shown that both ordinary peopleand trained experts are poor at discriminating between
liars and truth tellers [1], [4] and for an average person
performance is only slightly better than chance [9]. Empir-
ical evidence indicates that differences between cognitive
processes will often make liars experience a different mental
state than truth tellers [17]. Liars may experience feelings of
guilt, anxiety, anger, disgust, fear, and shame more often than
truth tellers [8].
Polygraph technology involves various contact sensors to
measure changes in blood pressure, respiratory, cardiovas-
cular, and electrodermal activity [11], [35], [40]. Pavlidis
et al. reported that on average, the accuracy of polygraph
examination is around 90% for adequately controlled specific-
incident tests [31], [33]. However, manual analysis takes time
and makes the outcome expert dependent [24]. Processing
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of a typical 10-minute interrogation session using polygraph
technology may take several hours [37]. The speed limitation
of the polygraph and the need for trained experts to run poly-
graph testing motivated researchers to investigate automated
credibility assessment using non-invasive technology.
Behavioural and facial-based approaches for detecting
deception are unobtrusive and do not require the subject’s
cooperation. Automated deception detection is based on the
assumption that guilt manipulation results in measurable phys-
iological and/or behavioural changes that distinguish truth
tellers from deceivers [15], [16], [27], [32], [38]. Thermal
imaging [22] offers a non-contact approach of measuring
physiological features like blood flow [32], pulse rate [36],
blood vessels distribution [2], and breathing rate [13]. Thermal
cameras capture the surface skin temperature which can vary
due to emotion-specific bio-physiological states in the human
body. As such, facial thermal analysis could potentially pro-
vide reliable cues to deception because controlling emotions
can be difficult [9], [12], [41].
Thermal imaging techniques have been studied to detect
deception in mock-crime scenarios [30], [31], [33]. Both
instantaneous and sustained stress conditions can be detected
using thermal imaging since instantaneous stress brings about
an increase in the periorbital blood flow while sustained stress
is associated with elevated blood flow in the forehead [29].
Classifying responses as deceptive or truthful can be achieved
by finding relevant patterns in the input features using statis-
tical or machine learning techniques [18], [33]. Some of the
reported classification accuracies were as high as 87% [38]
and 91.7% [33].
In this paper, we investigate the potential use of thermal
facial analysis to detect deception based on information gather-
ing interviews. The novel aspects of this paper lie in adopting a
robust methodology for learning the model of deception based
on a larger number of test questions per person compared to
existing work. We also propose a framework for validating the
feature extraction and the decision making process in order to
evaluate the robustness of the developed approach. We begin
by presenting a review of closely related work, then cover
the framework for extracting thermal features and learning
the baseline for classifying deception. We also present our
deception detection experiment where deception is designed
around a learnt-story (i.e. based on character profiles). This
design considers various aspects from the theories on decep-
tion, in particular, we exploit cognitive load [44] by requiring
the participants to plan their lies before the test and by asking
questions not being covered by the profile. This requires the
subject to extend their lies beyond the learnt story, and as
such, increasing cognitive load. We also adopt the expectancy
violations theory [6] by using a within-subject approach for
detecting deception. In other words, rather than looking for
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the deception cues that are shared between humans in a given
experiment, our research attempts to find cues of deception
in relation to one specific person based on their own behav-
iour/baseline. This proved very significant and highlights the
fact that people respond differently even to the same stimuli
in similar situations (see Section III for details).
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Deception detection includes contributions from human
physiology, psychology, behaviour, human factors, and
machine intelligence. Behavioural and facial-based approaches
predict changes in the body’s internal states due to stress
caused by attempted control [26]. Attempting to conceal
the truth results in an emotional response which might pro-
duce measurable physiological characteristics, like blushing
[19], [46]. Deception might also produce measurable changes
in gaze behaviour which indicates recognition of the visual
stimuli [17] by causing the eyes to almost instantly move to
the visual stimulus without any cognitive effort [39].
Initial work by Pavlidis et al. investigated the potential of
using thermal imaging for anxiety detection [32]. They noted
that all subjects under stress had a sudden (less than 0.3 sec)
increase in blood flow around the eyes that was independent
of face or eye movement and cooling over the cheeks and
warming over the carotid. The mean temperature in the nasal
area remained the same. These changes reverted to their
pre-startle state within about 1 min [32].
A. Simulating Guilt and Lying
Cues to deception exist at varying strengths and are gener-
ally weak except when lies are about transgressions or highly
motivated [9]. The strength of deception cues is affected by
many factors including: the design of the study, the duration
of responses, and whether responses were prepared or not.
Simulating guilt and lying has been attempted using various
ideas. Lying about transgressions using mock crime scenarios
seems to be one of the most popular approaches that have
been used in the literature. Mock crimes include concealing
a banned object [19], stealing money [31], [47], stealing
jewellery [21], or airline passengers attempting to smuggle
contraband [25].
Other paradigms also exist, for example, participants might
state their attitudes to a series of issues on a personality scale,
then lie or tell the truth about their answers on those issues
(e.g. personal feelings, beliefs, facts, opinions or academic
interests) [9], [38]; describe other people [14]; lie about
personal and factual information readily accessible from long
term memory [44]; try to convince the interviewer that they
were qualified for the job [48]; describe experiences that did
or did not actually happen to them [28]; asked to watch a
video then tell a lie/truth about what they had seen; or sim-
ulate entirely different emotions from the true emotions they
experienced as they watched the video [9]. Some scenarios
are designed more closely to operational trials [10], [46].
For example, in [46] the participants told the truth or lied
about their forthcoming trip, the purpose of their visit, and
the intended length of stay.
In many experiments participants were instructed to lie
or tell the truth. However, there also exists scenarios where
participants lied or told the truth based on their own decision
(e.g. see [10] and [19]) and some studies allowed participants
to practice their lies before the interview [42], [43]. Liars who
prepare themselves when anticipating an interview typically
show fewer cues to deceit than unrehearsed spontaneous lies;
especially if liars correctly anticipated the questions [42]. Vrij
et al. indicated that while the anticipated questions failed to
predict the liars and truth tellers, the unanticipated questions
resulted in a prediction rate up to 80% [43].
B. Detecting Deception
Studies by Pavlidis et al. suggested that the thermal eye
signals from the deceptive subjects have a steeper ascend
compared with the responses from the non-deceptive sub-
jects [30], [31]. A subject was classified as deceptive if the
eye signals were closer to the eye signals of the deceptive
control subjects. In the search for better features that could
improve classification performance, Pavlidis et al. used the
product of the slopes of the “eye” curves in the question and
answer segments as input features of the classifier assuming a
bimodal distribution of the slope products and a threshold to
obtain the baseline and achieved a classification rate of 84%.
Pollina et al. presented a more elaborate approach for
extracting features [33]. The thermal recordings constituted
30 frames captured before and after the onset of the verbal
response for each question-answer segment. A correct classi-
fication rate of 91.7% for a set of 24 subjects was reported
based on the training performance [31].
Tsiamyrtzis et al. carried out a larger scale experiment under
various environmental conditions and the average periorbital
signal was used for discrimination [38]. A deceptive response
was predicted based on local and global slope changes and the
classification accuracy obtained using this scheme was 87%
for 39 subjects.
Warmelink et al. [46] also investigated the use of thermal
imaging for lie detection. Guilt and deception were simulated
by asking airport passengers to lie about their intended desti-
nation. In their experiment, 64% of truth tellers and 69% of
liars were classified correctly.
III. DATA AND RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the data collection set-up. For data
capture, we used a cooled mid-infrared camera: ORION
SC7000 (FLIR). The specified resolution of the camera is
640 ×512 pixels and 14-bit grey-level resolution, a sensitivity
of NEDT=20mK and operates in the 1.5-5μm waveband.
In total, 492 responses (249 lies and 243 truths) were collected
from twenty-five subjects. We have used a modified deception
scenario [46] which required participants to learn a story and
allow them to practice their lies before the interview.
All participants were instructed to read a brief description of
the research project and sign an informed consent form. The
participants were told that they were tested on interviewing
skills, and that the skill under examination was deception as
part of human communication. The facilitator explained to the
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Fig. 1. Experimental set-up: the subject’s thermal recordings are captured
while the examiner is asking the questions.
participants how the examination would be conducted, and
offered them a prize (book vouchers) if they were able to
convince the examiner that they were honest.
The participants were asked to lie about who they are and
what they do. A character profile was provided, and the subject
was allowed 5-10 minutes to learn the details before the exam-
ination. The character profile contained details on education,
family, and work of an assumed person. Each participant was
required to attend two separate interview sessions. The second
session was conducted two hours after the first session. Each
session consists of ten questions.
A. The Interview
It is possible to predict a suspect’s strategies from their
behaviour and thereby increase the chances of accurately
predicting guilt or innocence, as liars tend to become over-
controlled and show inhibited behaviour [26]. In this paper, we
have two separate examination sessions, in the truth session
the participant will be asked to be themselves and answer
all questions truthfully (as such there is no story to learn),
however in the lie session, we require the participant to learn
a character profile and the participant is expected to lie in
agreement with the learnt story. The lie-truth sessions were
counterbalanced in the sense that half the participants lied in
the first session while the other half told the truth. Before the
start of each session, each subject was asked four baseline
questions which were answered truthfully. The examiner was
then allowed to enter the room and the interrogation session
began. At the end of the interview, the facilitator verified with
the participant that he/she completed the task successfully.
The used scenarios were developed in consultation
with psychology and security experts from QinetiQ
(www.qinetiq.com). An example of a character profile
which was used in our experiment is shown next:
“You were born in Ireland but moved when you were
2 and grew up in Wales. Your family (mother, step-
father and two elder brothers) still live in Wales,
although your eldest brother who is 27 is looking at
emigrating to Australia. You enjoy theatre, films and
Fig. 2. A thermal image of a participant’s face during questioning. The left
and right eye corners were tracked for a period of 1.7 s (51 frames).
history and love to go to the cinema, museums, see
shows and go shopping with your friends. You are a
very caring person and love to host people at your
house. So often you will arrange dinner evening at
your house for friends and, as you like meeting new
people, the invitation is often open! You can speak
a bit of Latin and French, which has mainly been
self-taught from your studies and different texts you
have had to cover, although your grandparents now
live in France so when you visit them you are able
to practise and improve your French.”
When the subject is ready for the examination, the facili-
tator asks the participant four baseline questions which are
answered truthfully. These will be used to register the initial
thermal state of the participant. The examiner will be allowed
into the room and the interview starts by asking a number
of questions that have direct links to specific details in the
profile (e.g. “Where do your parents live?” “Tell me about
the place where you were born and/or grew up in?”) while
other questions were designed to force the subject to create
lies on the spot by asking about details that do not exist in the
character profile (e.g. “Describe the place where your parents
live?” “Describe for me one of your lecturers or supervisors”).
B. Methodology and Results
1) Extracting Thermal Patterns: The analysis of thermal
and visible facial data has advanced significantly over the
past decades. However, the automatic extraction of cues is
still a challenge and requires the ability to consistently track
motion of specific region/points of interest [20], [45] in order
to accurately infer internal emotions/behavioural states.
The first stage of data processing starts by manually iden-
tifying the two eye corners using two regions of interest
(ROI), 17 × 17 pixels each (see Figure 2). The temporal
interval is composed of 51 frames (or 1.7 s) formed by
taking 25 frames (taking 5 more/fewer frames had little effect
on the results) before and after the onset of the subject’s
verbal response to a given question. Both ROIs are tracked
over the entire response time-line using a robust tracker that
incrementally learns the appearance of the tracked region by
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efficiently representing it in a low-dimensional subspace [34].
This generates a 17×17×51 data volume for each eye corner,
which was reduced to a 51 dimensional vector by taking the
average value in each 17 × 17 ROI. The robustness of the
manual component in this tracking process and the size of
the ROI are evaluated through a set of experiments which we
discuss in Section III-D.
In order to compare the subject’s truth responses with lie
responses on an equal footing, baseline thermal correction is
required to compensate for the differences in starting ther-
mal levels. Baseline temperature correction was achieved by
subtracting the mean of the four baseline questions from the
recording session from all the interview responses for a given
subject. Finally, the extracted signatures from both the left and
right eye corners are concatenated to form a 102-dimensional
feature vector which is then reduced to fewer dimensions
by applying principal components analysis (the effect of the
choice of number of principal components is discussed in
Section III-D).
C. Learning the Model of Deception
A profile of normal/abnormal behaviour can be learned
from data gathered from deceptive and truthful interactions.
Machine learning can be used to train a classifier that cap-
tures the model of deceptive/non-deceptive responses based
on either a between-person or a within-person approach. For
classification purposes we have used the nearest neighbour
classifier because this is a well-known, simple, non-linear,
and generic classifier. The nearest neighbour classifier scores a
response by assigning the class that receives most votes within
a specified neighbourhood size, k. Alternative classification
methodologies can also be used (e.g. SVM, logistic regression,
decision trees [3]), however, we leave this as further work.
1) Between-Person Approach: The between person
approach uses the lie/truth responses from all but one person
as the training dataset while the left-out person’s lie/truth
responses are used as the test dataset. This is done in a
round robin way to reuse all persons as the test dataset.
This approach is also called leave-one-person-out and could
answer the question of whether deceptive patterns generalise
across the whole population.
Figure 3 shows the effect of choosing different values of k
on the average between-person performance, where we have
kept the two largest principal components of the transformed
thermal signature (in Section III-D we discuss the effect of
using more principal components). Each box represents the
variation in the predictive accuracy across 25 individuals. We
see that as k varies from 5 to 50, the average predictive
accuracy varies between 58-62% with a maximum accuracy
obtained for k = 21. We also tested a modified baseline
thermal correction where the data is transformed to compa-
rable scales by dividing the mean-corrected responses by the
standard deviation. This did not improve the classification
performance and the accuracy remained 62%. This can be
explained by noting that each individual’s responses were
normalised based on the mean and standard deviation of that
individual and as such does not affect the pool for the between-
subjects dataset.
Fig. 3. The average between-person estimate of predictive performance over
25 persons obtained by the k-nearest neighbour classifier versus k. Each box
represents the variation in the predictive accuracy across 25 individuals. The
central mark on each box is the median (red -), the black “+” represents the
mean, the edges of the box are the 25th and 75th percentiles, the whiskers
extend to the most extreme data points not considered outliers, and outliers
are plotted individually as red +’s.
TABLE I
BETWEEN PERSON CROSS VALIDATION ESTIMATE OF PREDICTIVE
PERFORMANCE USING THE k-NEAREST NEIGHBOUR CLASSIFIER
(k = 21), AVERAGE CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY 61.96%
As an explorative example, Table I shows the estimated
classification accuracy using the k-nearest neighbour classifier
(k = 21) and again keeping the two largest principal compo-
nents of the transformed thermal signature. Note that responses
from subjects 2, 12, 14, 18, 20, and 22 were predicted with
accuracy below 50% while the responses from subjects 1, 3, 7,
9, 21, 23, and 24 were correctly predicted with at least 80%.
The average classification accuracy over all 25 persons in the
dataset is 61.96%. It should be noted that these results do not
differ significantly from a random chance distribution (at the
p < 0.01 level).
The above results indicate that deceptive behaviour does not
generalise well across the whole population. This conclusion
could be explained by the fact that people react differently as
they lie. There are also people who are simply bad liars while
others might be able to tell lies that are hard to detect. In more
scientific terms, the leave-one-person-out approach results in
different probability distributions for the training and test sets,
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TABLE II
ESTIMATE OF PREDICTIVE PERFORMANCE FOR INDIVIDUAL PERSONS
OBTAINED BY THE k-NEAREST NEIGHBOUR CLASSIFIER (k = 5) USING
THE WITHIN PERSON APPROACH AVERAGED OVER 50 RUNS.
− INDICATES NO STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE COMPARED
WITH A RANDOM CHOICE DISTRIBUTION, p < 0.01 (P-VALUE
CALCULATED RELATIVE TO INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS)
and as such, the model obtained from the training data will
not be a good predictor on the test set. Therefore, it makes
more sense to compare the person’s own lie/truth responses
based on the within-person cross-validation approach and this
is discussed next.
2) Within-Person Approach: The within-person approach,
inspired by the expectancy violations theory [6], is concerned
with comparing behavioural profiles against the expected
norms. Therefore it is more concerned with classifying a
response according to whether it includes deviations from a
baseline or discrepancies among indicators [6].
In order to guard against over-fitting, it is necessary to
implement n-fold cross-validation to monitor the classification
performance: First, we partition the dataset of the lie/truth
responses from a specific subject into n folds using stratified
sampling. The training set is then constructed by concatenating
n −1 folds used to train the model, while using the remaining
fold to test the model. This is done in a round-robin approach
to generate a total of n local models and n test sets. We then
compute the percentage of correctly classified responses by
examining the predictions within each test fold and compare
it with the ground truth.
Table II shows the average classification accuracy for each
subject (using two principal components from the thermal
signature) measured over 50 runs and tested using leave-
one-question-out (LOQO), five-fold cross-validation (5FCV)
and two-fold cross-validation (2FCV). For example, using
five-fold cross validation, the average classification accuracy
for Subject 1 is 72.60% with a standard deviation of 6.48%
(calculated over 50 runs). The performance across all persons
using five-fold cross validation is 85.56%. On the other
hand, the leave-one-question-out cross validation, results in
an average classification accuracy of 84.40%. These results
indicate that using a training set comprising ∼95% (LOQO),
∼80% (5FCV), or ∼50% (2FCV) of the data (questions) does
produce minor differences (84.40, 85.56, and 82.61 correct
classification, respectively), which indicates the robustness of
the developed approach. It should be noted that all three sets of
results differ significantly from a random chance distribution
(at the p < 0.01 level).
D. Effect of Parameter Settings
In this section, we investigate the robustness of the devel-
oped approach and look at the effect of the tracker and the
size/localisation of the region of interest on the classification
results.
1) Choice of Eye-Corner Positions: In thermal imaging, the
eye-corner regions appear as a smooth (diffused) surface with
a relatively higher grey level appearance. Figure 4 (left image)
shows the variation in eye-corners positions as a result of this
manual selection process. This indicates that due to the manual
selection process there can be variation in the start position of
the tracker, but that the tracked region (Figure 4 right image
shows the position in the last frame) is stable. It is expected
that this is also the case if one uses automatic detection of the
eye corners. It is clear that the tracker maintains reasonable
estimates over time of what it thinks the eye corner region is
and successfully copes with image displacements.
We investigated the effect of variation in the eye corner
positions on the extracted signatures and the classification
performance. We repeated the tracking experiment five times
where each time a new location for the eye corner was chosen
independently of the previous trial (a fixed region of interest of
size 17 ×17 pixels was used). We did this for all subjects and
use all the questions. The corresponding thermal signatures are
shown in Figure 5 where the “blue curves” represent the truth
signatures and the “red curves” represent the lie signatures. It
is clear that there can be a considerable effect on the thermal
levels and this is especially clear for the truth responses which
are extracted from the right eye corner (i.e. frames 52-102). In
particular, the figure shows that the bottom two truth responses
are very close to the temperature levels of the lie responses. As
such, it is clear that different initialisations could potentially
affect the classification accuracy (e.g. such as the bottom two
truth responses extracted from the right eye region).
To show the effect on the classification accuracy we again
use the within-person approach with five fold cross-validation.
The resulting average classification accuracy over five repeti-
tions (trials) for all subjects are shown in the first column of
Table III. The results indicate that the choice of eye-corner
position could have a significant impact on performance. The
statistical significance of the combination of the five corners
is estimated using a meta-analysis approach [5], which for
each subject takes all five mean and standard deviations into
account. This analysis shows that for subjects 10 and 22
the results are not significant. Not all the variation is purely
1020 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 9, NO. 6, JUNE 2014
Fig. 4. Five corner positions for subject #1 obtained using five independent trials. Left: initial positions of corners. Right: tracked corners at the last frame
of the sequence (the 51st frame).
TABLE III
THE FIRST COLUMN SHOWS THE EFFECT OF THE VARIATION IN INITIAL
EYE CORNER POSITIONS ON THE PREDICTIVE PERFORMANCE (USING A
FIXED 17 × 17 ROI). THE SECOND COLUMN SHOWS THE EFFECT OF THE
VARIATION IN THE SIZE OF THE ROI ON THE PREDICTIVE PERFORMANCE
(USING A FIXED EYE CORNER POSITION). THE RESULTS IN THIS TABLE
ARE ALL BASED ON A WITHIN PERSON APPROACH AND 5FCV
AVERAGED OVER 50 RUNS. − INDICATES NO STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCE COMPARED WITH A RANDOM CHOICE DISTRIBUTION,
p < 0.01 (P-VALUE CALCULATED RELATIVE TO INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS
USING A META-ANALYSIS APPROACH [5])
attributed to variation in initial corners location. On average a
5% standard deviation is due to the effect of different possible
ways one can split the data into five folds (e.g. see second
column of Table II which shows effect of repeating data
partitioning 50 times).
2) Effect of the Size of the Region of Interest: The size of the
region of interest determines how many pixels are involved in
Fig. 5. The corresponding thermal signatures for five independent initialisa-
tion of the eye region tracker. This figure shows the effect of manual variation
of the eye tracker starting point on the extracted thermal levels. The “blue
curves” represent the truth signatures and the “red curves” represent the lie
signatures. Note that the sample index 1-51 represents the left eye region
and 52-102 the right eye region, and as such there can be a discontinuity at
the 51-52 transition. In addition, the bottom two truth responses (i.e. frames
52-102 which are extracted from the right eye corner) are very close to the
temperature levels of the lie responses.
computing the mean temperature. The smaller the size of the
region of interest the fewer pixels and the average temperature
will haver higher frequency variations over time while a larger
region of interest will produce smoother signatures. Figure 6
shows the extracted mean signatures for using window sizes
of 9 × 9 and 65 × 65 pixels, respectively, and in the second
column of Table III we show the corresponding variation in
the classification results. The statistical significance of the
combination of the four ROIs is estimated using a meta-
analysis approach [5], which for each subject takes all four
mean and standard deviations into account. This analysis
shows that for subjects 5 and 22 the results are not significant.
3) Marginalising Ad Hoc Parameters: Table III indicated
that the choice of ad hoc parameters, in particular the location
of the eye corner region and the size of the measurement region
of interest, has an effect on the classification performance.
However instead of using a pre-specified size for the ROI and
a single estimate of the eye corner position, it would be more
reasonable to extract the thermal signature by averaging across
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Fig. 6. Extracted signature using two sizes for the region of interest (9 × 9,
and 65 × 65). Note that the sample index 1-51 represents the left eye region
and 52-102 the right eye region, and as such there can be a discontinuity at
the 51-52 transition.
different corner positions and window sizes, which will reduce
the noise aspects. This is expected to have a significant impact
on the robustness of the thermal deception detection classi-
fier: Table IV (left column) shows the resulting classification
accuracies, using (as before), two principal components. The
right column, on the other hand, shows the effect of using
eight principal components. Using two principal components
the average classification accuracy for subject 1 over 50 runs
and using 5FCV is 78.64% with a standard deviation of 2.05%
and a retained signal variance of 97.22%. It should be noted
that both sets of results differ significantly from a random
chance distribution (at the p < 0.01 level).
Adding more features by using more than two principal
components seems to improve the classification accuracy (and
the difference is just statistically significant at p < 0.01),
however, the number of training examples per subject is
relatively small with respect to the number of features and
these effects with respect to the generalisation of the classifier
are future work.
4) Tracking Performance: To show the effect of tracking
fluctuations on the extracted signature we initialised two
independent trackers to start at the same position and observe
the Euclidean disagreement between the two estimated posi-
tions for a time period of 300 frames. The non-deterministic
aspect of the used tracker [34] means it will not necessarily
track the same path along the video sequence. Supporting
video material (file: tracking_same_point.mov in the online
resources at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org) shows that the trackers
maintain a stable position within the eye corner region. The
Euclidean displacement error between the two trackers is
shown in Figure 7. The disagreement between the two trackers
can sometimes reach four pixels, however, this disagreement
is not propagated in future frames and in general both tend
to agree to a reasonable degree. The average disagreement
between the two estimates of the future eye corner positions
over 300 frames is around 1.21 pixels which is well within
the variation produced by manual (human) estimate for the
eye corner positions (see Figure 4).
We now show the effect of this displacement on the
extracted thermal signature. We used the tracker output of
TABLE IV
THE PREDICTIVE PERFORMANCE FOR INDIVIDUAL PERSONS OBTAINED
BY THE k-NEAREST NEIGHBOUR CLASSIFIER (k = 5) USING THE WITHIN
PERSON APPROACH AND 5FCV AVERAGED OVER 50 RUNS. FIVE
DIFFERENT CORNER POSITIONS WERE TRACKED AND SIGNATURES
WERE THEN EXTRACTED BY AVERAGING THE RESPONSES OVER FOUR
ROI WINDOW WIDTHS (9, 17, 33, AND 65 PIXELS). THE FIRST COLUMN
SHOW RESULTS WHEN TWO PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS WERE USED
(− FOR SUBJECTS 4 AND 10 INDICATE STATISTICALLY NOT SIGNIFICANT,
p < 0.01). FOR EXAMPLE, USING TWO PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS, THE
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY FOR SUBJECT 1 IS 78.64% WITH A
STANDARD DEVIATION OF 2.05% AND A RETAINED ENERGY OF 97.22%.
SECOND COLUMN SHOWS RESULTS USING EIGHT PRINCIPAL
COMPONENTS, WHERE ALL RESULTS ARE STATISTICALLY
SIGNIFICANT. THE P-VALUES ARE CALCULATED WITH
RESPECT TO INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS
Fig. 7. Disagreement between two trackers initialised at the same image
point.
the previous experiment as the starting point. The first frame
of the sequence is replicated to generate a full 300 frame
video, with each frame displaced according to the tracker
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Fig. 8. Percentage difference between the ground truth temperature level
and the extracted thermal response.
displacement in the original sequence. In addition, each frame
is rotated by nπ/30, where n is the frame number in the
sequence. We subsequently initialise the tracker using the
same starting point as in the original sequence. The robustness
of the tracker can be estimated by evaluating the difference
between the thermal response at the initial tracker point and
the subsequent tracker position. Supporting video material
(file: Synthesised_frames.mov in the online resources) shows
that the tracker maintains a stable position within the eye
corner region. Figure 8 shows the percentage difference of
the extracted thermal responses which shows a maximum
deviation of at most ±0.3%.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Skin surface temperature can be affected by other fac-
tors than deception including: facial expressions [23], body
metabolism, changes in the underlying musculo-thermal activ-
ities, thermal emissions from the surrounding environment
and illness. Therefore, it is important to compensate for such
effects by taking into account the different initial baseline
temperatures of each individual. Variations in the extracted
thermal signatures can be due to how different people respond
to the interview question but also due to the choice of different
initialisations and parameter settings. We have addressed the
variations that might occur as a result of choosing approximate
location of the eye corner and as well as selecting different
region sizes. It should be noted that overall there is a clear
effect on the classification performance and it is recommended
to extract more robust thermal signatures by averaging across
corner positions and ROI sizes.
Using the generic anxiety level as a measure of decep-
tion can produce high misclassification rates - observing
what appears to be agitation or over-controlled behaviour
does not necessarily indicate deception, in addition, self-
regulatory demands of lying do not always exceed those of
truth telling [9]. In our experiment we verified this and showed
that a between-person approach has poor predictive perfor-
mance. Learning models of deception based on a leave-one-
person-out methodology assumes that the same behaviours and
body responses are shared globally across humans of various
ages, genders, culture, etc. which so far has not been shown
to be accurate. The average classification accuracy using a
leave-one-person-out methodology varies between 58-62%.
The poor predictive performance is due to the fact that the
joint probability distribution of the inputs (thermal data) and
outputs (class labels) of the test person is different from the
joint distribution formed by all other persons in the training set.
The within-individual approach requires us to learn a clas-
sifier for each subject based only on a subset of the subject’s
responses which are used as ground truth. This scheme agrees
with the expectancy violations theory [7]. By only considering
a person’s baseline model, one is able to detect abnormal
variations that might have been triggered by a deceptive
response. Our results indicate that the performance across all
persons using five-fold cross validation and eight principal
components is robust and is statistically significant for all
subjects (p < 0.01) and with a total average of 86.88%.
As the case of various proposed scenarios for simulating
deception in the laboratory which are reported in the literature,
our scenario is not very different and is still considered a
laboratory-based simulation of deception. As such it is not
a true representation of a real-life situations where the stakes
are high and individuals are highly motivated to succeed, as
otherwise, severe consequences might be faced (e.g. loss of
fortune / jail / etc.) which applies for both liars and truth
tellers. Nevertheless, this study identifies various factors that
contribute to successful implementation/testing of automated
deception detection in the real world.
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